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DSO and the South African Police Service (SAPS).
To avoid further political and legal rows concerning
the DSO, President Mbeki appointed Judge Sisi
Khampepe on 1 April 2005 to head a Commission
of Inquiry to ‘inquire into, make findings, report on
and make recommendations’ regarding the mandate
and location of the DSO.
In June 2006 President Mbeki and his Cabinet
adopted the recommendations of the Khampepe
Commission, but the report was only made public
almost two years later, in May 2008, soon after
Cabinet had endorsed draft laws to dissolve the
Scorpions and have them integrated into the SAPS.
These Bills reflected the ANC’s decision to
dismantle the Scorpions, as was agreed by the party
at its 2007 Polokwane Conference. 
The concerns of the Commission
The Khampepe Commission of Inquiry was
established to respond to concerns and questions
relating to the role and functioning of the DSO that
had been raised by the public, components of the
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The Directorate of Special Operations (DSO)was established in 1999 with the specificresponsibility to investigate and prosecute
cases of organised crime and corruption. The DSO,
also known as the Scorpions, was located in the
National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) to allow for
prosecutor-led investigations. Within no time the
Scorpions were involved in a number of high-level
investigations involving the political and economic
elite of South Africa. The perceived success of their
investigations, particularly against high-ranking
public officials, brought them a measure of public
support. However, repeated media leaks about their
investigations and allegations of abuse of power in
the exercise of search warrants (particularly in the
Jacob Zuma case), led to criticism from politicians
who felt that the Scorpions were being used to
influence the outcome of the power struggle between
President Thabo Mbeki and Zuma in the ANC. 
In 2005 the legality of the Scorpions’ mandate was
called into question and problems were raised about
the apparently strained relationship between the
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The Commission was tasked with the responsibility
of obtaining clarification on the location, mandate
and operation of the DSO vis-à-vis other relevant
government departments or institutions (Khampepe
2006: 6-7). 
Selected extracts
It is against this background that the Khampepe
report presents an overview, findings and
recommendations on eleven key issues. These are: 
1. The rationale for the establishment of the DSO 
2. The legislative mandate of the DSO
3. Systems for management and control of the DSO
4. Systems for communication of the DSO
5. Oversight and accountability in respect of 
intelligence and related operations of the DSO
6. Constitutional and legislative mandates of the 
SAPS
7. Systems for co-ordination and co-operation 
between the SAPS, intelligence agencies and the
DSO
8. The effectiveness and efficiency of co-ordination 
of intelligence: DSO/SAPS/NIA
9. The efficacy of co-ordinating systems that exist 
between the intelligence agencies
10. Training or further training on policing or 
investigating methods
11 The impact of locating investigators and 
prosecutors within the National Prosecuting
Authority
As will be highlighted in the summaries that follow,
one of the key themes that cuts across the report
concerns the presence, or not, of links between the
work of the DSO and SAPS in the fight against
crime. The article will focus on selected aspects of
the report that best explain the position of the
Commission with regard to the location, mandate
and operation of the DSO.
The rationale for the establishment of the DSO 
The Khampepe Commission report highlights four
principal reasons behind the establishment of the
DSO. These are the perceived incapacity of the
SAPS to investigate high-level priority crimes, the
need to develop a multi-disciplinary approach in the
fight against corruption, the need to establish an
entity that would be able to attract and retain highly
skilled personnel, and lastly, the perceived
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criminal justice system and from the intelligence
community. As outlined in the Khampepe
Commission Report, these concerns related to:
(a) the perceived institutional nightmare of the DSO 
mandate to: 
(i) investigate and to carry out any 
function incidental thereto;  
(ii) gather, keep and analyse 
information; and  
(iii) institute criminal proceedings, 
relating to offences or unlawful activities
committed in an organised fashion…
(b) the jurisprudential soundness of housing the 
investigative and prosecutorial capacities of the
DSO in one structure under the authority of the
National Director of Public Prosecution (NDPP),
with  the minister for justice and constitutional
development exercising final political
responsibility over the DSO.
(c) the overlapping mandates of the DSO and the 
SAPS with regard to the investigation of
national priority crimes, including organised
crime and the duplication of resources resulting
there-from.
(d) the existence within the DSO of an information 
[intelligence] gathering capacity that functions
outside the legislative framework of the
designated intelligence structures, the
uncertainty and the exclusion of the DSO from
the Intelligence oversight Act, 40 of 1994,
thereby making its intelligence activities not
subject to the oversight functions of the
Inspector General of Intelligence and the joint
standing committee on intelligence.
(e) lack of coordination and cooperation between 
the DSO on the one part, the SAPS and the
designated intelligence structures, such as the
NIA and the SASS on the other.
(f) the location of the DSO within the National 
Prosecuting Authority and consequently under
the Department of Justice, which was argued to
be in conflict with the provisions of the
Constitution. The amalgamation of both law
enforcement (policing) as well as justice
(prosecuting) elements in the DSO were
exacerbated due to the competition over
jurisdictional territory and the concurrence of
mandates.  
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illegitimacy of the SAPS for historical and political
reasons. After careful consideration of the
information, evidence and arguments concerning the
establishment of the DSO, the report concludes by
arguing that the rationale for the establishment of the
DSO is as valid today as it was at conception
(Khampepe 2006:24).     
The legislative mandate of the DSO
Section 12 of the report examines the legislative
mandate of the DSO. The findings clarify and
provide justifications for the DSO’s legal mandate to
investigate and prosecute serious crimes within the
parameters of a single entity. Sub-section 12.1 states: 
The argument that the legal mandate of the
DSO to investigate and prosecute serious
organised crime is unconstitutional within the
meaning of section 199(1) of the Constitution
is without merit. It is clear from the reading
of the constitutional judgment in the Minister
of Defence v Potsane 2002 (1) SA 1 (CC), at
p.14, para 26 that the meaning of ‘single’ ...
conveys no more than the fact that various
police forces that used to form part of the
‘independent’ homelands ... would be
amalgamated into one single police force.
The word ‘single’ does not therefore connote
‘exclusive’ (Khampepe 2006:38).
The report highlights the fact that the legislature
intentionally drafted the legal mandate of the DSO
to be wide and argues that this was prudent. This is
based on the fact that organised crime syndicates are
not only pervasive, but that they are also are highly
sophisticated and command huge financial resources
that enable them to mount heavyweight legal
defences with a view to resisting prosecutions and/or
convictions. (Khampepe 2006:39). Khampepe argues
that an overly prescriptive legal mandate would
have led to constant judicial attacks and would have
frustrated the DSO’s ability to fulfill its mandate.
The report goes on to insist that ‘there is nothing
impermissible in law to draft the legal mandate of
the DSO to be as broad as it appears in the NPA Act’
(Khampepe 2006:40). In addition, the report argues
that there is nothing unconstitutional in the DSO
sharing the mandate to tackle organised crime with
the SAPS, but acknowledges that the proper
management of tensions that may arise from a
shared mandate is a challenge.
However, the report does raise concerns about the
conduct of the DSO. Based on evidence and
arguments made before the Commission, the report
reveals that the implementation of the legal mandate
of the DSO was not entirely satisfactory. In
particular, the leaking of information to the media
was identified as a problem. The report notes that
when the subject matter of DSO investigations is
published it can lead to the prejudice of the persons
under investigation. Besides indicating an abuse of
power by the DSO, this may also point to a possible
violation of the rights and freedoms protected under
the Bill of Rights (Khampepe 2006:11). Here the
Commission found that the DSO tended to go
beyond its ‘information’ gathering mandate to
include intelligence gathering (also see section 24
below). 
In an attempt to come to terms with some of the
scathing criticisms that have been levelled against
the DSO, section 15 (Findings in relation to the
evaluation of the implementation of the legislative
mandate of the DSO) suggests that this might be
because the DSO is better resourced than the SAPS
and also has the ‘unfair’ advantage of being able to
select cases for its investigations. The Commission
believed that this gave rise to a competitive
environment and caused conflict and tensions
between the DSO and the SAPS. 
The Commission critically questioned the role of the
Ministerial Co-ordinating Committee (MCC) which
was intended (in the NPA Act) to address a number
of issues relating to the functioning of the DSO.
Sub-section 15.1 points out that the MCC did not
properly discharge its responsibility under the Act
and that it therefore also failed to avert or mitigate
some of the problems between the SAPS and the
DSO. Sub-section 15.3 states that the resistance by
both DSO investigators and prosecutors to relocate
to the SAPS was suggestive of a lack of shared
objective amongst officials of the law enforcement
agencies to perform their functions in fighting crime,
irrespective of where a particular institution is
located. This compares poorly to other countries
where various entities that fight organised crime
share legal mandates and strategies to tackle certain
crimes. 
DSO systems for communication 
In section 22 (‘Recommendations in relation to the
systems for communication of the DSO’) the
Commission argued that ‘it cannot be
overemphasised that the DSO as a law enforcement
agency and an organ of state is constitutionally
bound to act within the law. It is enjoined by the
Bill of Rights to respect the rights of every person,
including those who may fall within its target (sting)
of investigation or prosecution’ (Khampepe
2006:61). The key issue to bear in mind here is that
the Scorpions needed to discharge their
responsibilities within the parameters of the
Constitution and with due regard to the Bill of
Rights.   
Oversight and accountability in respect of the
intelligence and related operations of the DSO
Issues concerning the oversight and accountability
in respect of the intelligence and related operations
of the DSO are for the most part dealt with in
Sections 23 to 25. The Commission found that,
although the DSO is mandated to gather, keep and
analyse information as is conferred upon it in terms
of section 7(1) (a) (ii) of the NPA Act, the bulk of the
evidence before the Commission as well as the on-
site visits to the DSO tended to show that the DSO
had established intelligence gathering capabilities.
The report states that ‘this goes beyond the ambit of
its information-gathering mandate set out in section
7 of the NPA Act’ (Khampepe 2006:66-67) and
would be in conflict with the Constitution. 
The report deals with the disjunction in political
accountability for the work of the DSO between the
Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development
and the Minister of Safety and Security (Khampepe
2006: 61-73). It noted that although the Minister for
Justice and Constitutional Development exercises
final responsibility over the work of the NPA, she
does not have practical, effective political oversight
in respect of the law enforcement work of the DSO.
The Minister of Safety and Security exercises final
responsibility for law enforcement, yet he does not
have political responsibility in respect of the
investigative work of the DSO. 
It is in this regard that section 25
(‘Recommendations in relation to the oversight and
accountability of the intelligence operations of the
DSO’) goes on to:  
• Insist on the harmonisation of the ‘political
oversight over the activities of the DSO’
• Remind us of the ‘inherent need for all law 
enforcement agencies to have a joint purpose in
addressing all law enforcement responsibilities...
The tensions that bedevil the relationship of the
DSO and the SAPS are incompatible with the
constitutional responsibilities of these
institutions.  It is critical that these institutions
answer positively to the constitutional mandate
for co-operative governance required of all
organs of state’
• Call upon the President to exercise ‘the power 
conferred on him in terms of section 97(b) of the
Constitution to transfer the power or function
entrusted to the Minister for Justice and
Constitutional Development by the NPA Act to
the Minister of Safety and Security thereby
vesting political authority over the law
enforcement component of the DSO in the
Minister of Safety and Security’. 
• Caution that ’the DSO should act within the 
parameters of its legislative mandate and not
impinge on the territory constitutionally assigned
to other entities’
• Call for ’greater co-operation and inter-
dependence as well as enhanced skills and
expertise between and among the law
enforcement agencies’
• Call for a legislative overhaul of the disjunction 
in political accountability over the DSO. Again
the emphasis is that the President can rectify it
in terms of section 97(b) of the constitution. 
(Khampepe 2006:71-73)  
Systems for co-ordination and co-operation
between SAPS, intelligence agencies and the DSO
Sections 30–31 of the report deal with the findings
and recommendations concerning the systems for
co-ordination and operation between the SAPS,
intelligence agencies and the DSO. Here it becomes
evident that there were no systems of co-ordination
and co-operation between the DSO and the SAPS.
The report recommends that the DSO should form
part of the family of law enforcement structures and
SA CRIME QUARTERLY No 24 • JUNE 200838 KANYEGIRIRE
SA CRIME QUARTERLY No 24 • JUNE 2008 39KANYEGIRIRE
share expertise and information for an overall
effective crime combating strategy. 
Training or further training on policing or
investigating methods 
The Commission’s concerns over the absence of
cooperation and co-ordination between the DSO
and SAPS find further expression in sections 39 and
40 that deal with issues of training. In accordance
with proponents of the view that the DSO has been
far better resourced than the SAPS, the report argues
that the Commercial Organised Crime Unit of the
SAPS, which has related responsibilities, should be
furnished with the same equipment, resources and
legal powers in order to emulate the successes of
the DSO.  The report goes on to state that, given
the lack of effective cooperation between and
coordination of the activities of the DSO and the
SAPS, it is inescapable that there may be
duplication in the resources both institutions
channel towards training.  The recommendation
here is that ‘the DSO and the SAPS streamline the
training of their personnel to achieve greater
efficiencies’ (Khampepe 2006:92). 
Location of investigators and prosecutors within
the NPA
As previously indicated in this summary of the
Khampepe Commission Report, it is evident that
one of the contentious issues that has characterised
the debate on the Scorpions includes the location of
investigators and prosecutors within the NPA.
Opponents of this – including the SAPS – have
argued that it is unsound to locate investigators and
prosecutors under one roof. The logical conclusion
to this would be that prosecutors should remain
within the prosecuting authority and the law
enforcement officers redeployed back to the SAPS
(Khampepe 2006:93). The argument apparently
hinged on the assumption that the presence of
prosecutors and investigators under one roof could
compromise the activities of the prosecutors. 
Despite this, the report draws attention to the use of
multi-disciplinary structures, that is, having
prosecutors, intelligence operatives or analysts as
well as investigators in a team, in foreign
jurisdictions. In countries such as the USA, multi-
disciplinary structures (‘Strike Forces’) are created
for specific purposes with various elements within it
reporting to their respective authorities. The report
also provides the examples of England and Wales,
where the Serious Organised Crime Agency is a
multi-disciplinary structure yet does not fall under
the Crown Prosecution Service. 
Although the report notes concerns that the
inclusion of prosecutors in the DSO investigating
teams could compromise their independence it
nevertheless argues that the various disciplines
within the DSO should remain under a single
command structure. This is based on the view that
the structure of the DSO enhances closer co-
operation among the various disciplines, as the
prosecutors and the investigators benefit from one
another’s expertise, thereby making cross-
pollination an effective strategy in combating crime
and returning higher conviction ratios.
Location of the DSO 
With regard to the specific location of the DSO,
section 45 of the Report lists those entities or
relevant individuals that either supported or
opposed the current location of the DSO. Those in
favour included:
• The Minister for Intelligence Services 
• The Inspector General of Intelligence 
• National Intelligence Coordinating Committee 
(NICOC) 
• The Institute of Security Studies 
• The Foundation for Human Rights 
• Prof. Kader Asmal 
• Ms Fatima Chohan  
• The DSO  
Those in the opposing camp who called for the
translocation of the DSO to the SAPS included the
SAPS and the National Intelligence Agency (NIA). 
The recommendations in section 47 regarding the
question of the location of the DSO argue that ‘the
rationale for locating the DSO under the NDPP and
the Minister for Justice and Constitutional
Development in 2002 still pertains’ (Khampepe
2006:103-104). This was based both on the
existence of other investigative directorates
(Independent Directorate: Serious Economic
Offences and Independent Directorate: Organised
Crime) under the NPA and because DSO
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recommendations. Parliament will have to give
effect to these recommendations and harmonise
their implementation with existing legal
provisions of the relevant pieces of legislations
and government policies. 
• The threat that organised crime presents to the 
democratic institutions and economic integrity
of the country poses a formidable challenge that
will continually require creative and determined
strategies to address. These strategies will
include, by definition, enhanced co-operation
among the various law enforcement structures
whose primary constitutional responsibility it is
to secure the country and its people.
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investigations were to be prosecution-led, thus it
could only be located within the prosecuting
authority, which constitutionally is authorised to
institute prosecutions. 
However, the report draws attention to the fact that
(sub-section 47.3) the SAPS and the DSO still did
not appreciate the legal imperative for co-operation.
The Commission called for decisive executive
action to compel a realignment of attitudes by these
institutions. One of these actions would be to
transfer political oversight and responsibility over to
the law enforcement component of the DSO to the
Minister of Safety and Security. Still the Commission
insisted that the DSO should continue to be located
within the NPA. 
Conclusion 
The Report of the Khampepe Commission of Inquiry
into the mandate of the Directorate of Special
Operations concludes with the following key four
points, contained in sections 53, 54, 55 and 56
respectively (Khampepe 2006:112):   
• The inexorable quest for an effective and 
efficient strategy to tackle organised crime must
run like a golden thread through the whole
tapestry of the law enforcement/prosecutorial
and intelligence structures. The attainment and
maintenance of that efficacy is dependent on
the law enforcement/prosecutorial structures
cooperating and coordinating their activities
closely with one another as well as with the
requisite statutory intelligence structures. 
• The imperfections in the inter-relationship of the 
law enforcement structures including the
relationship of the DSO with such structures
giving rise to the establishment of the
Commission derive largely to operational
matters. It is necessary therefore to create – on
an ongoing basis – a review mechanism to
manage the constant challenges that may arise
in the execution of the work of these structures. 
• The report deals with various aspects that would 
require the Legislature’s consideration to give
effect to these recommendations and to
harmonise the implementation of these
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